The most important lesson of this book about nineteenth-century radicals may be that America has been crazy for a long, long time.
Even the calmest of today’s bourgeoisie are in fact inheritors of traditions shaped by heretics, crackpots, cranks, radicals, and loons – and it is all too easy for conservatives or leftists to construct a whitewashed version of history in which only one or two shiny threads – a stripped-down Judaeo-Christian morality or the leftward march of Progress – is remembered.
But Gilbert Seldes’ recently rereleased 1928 book
The Stammering Century shows how closely tied both Christian revivalism and Northeastern-style reform movements were to anarchic, commune-forming movements full of utopians and would-be prophets. It’s fitting the introduction to this edition is by Greil Marcus, best known for his free-associative tracing of the ties between medieval mystics, Dadaism, and punk rock.
(It’s also fitting the book comes recommended by both the establishment magazine
New Republic and my old conservative/radical frenemy
Helen Rittelmeyer, at a time when I’m increasingly aware that
many, perhaps even most, of my acquaintances are radical weirdoes of one kind or another and/or that many of them, not coincidentally, may be mildly autistic as well – much like
this year’s Miss Montana – and thus perhaps deserve to be cut some slack even as a wary eye is kept on them. I suppose as of this week the test of whether they’re
officially crazy will be whether they can get gun permits. As for Helen, she’s been taking a year off in Australia, where I will assume she’s mellowed and matured and thus deserves to be placed on some interesting magazine’s staff once more, so she can fulfill her inevitable destiny of being one of her generation’s most interesting and occasionally frightening writer/editors.)
With thousands of Americans attending the Burning Man art festival out in the southwestern desert each year, and hundreds of thousands tuning in to libertarian conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, it’s tempting to think the country’s getting weirder, but Seldes, simply by cataloguing numerous mostly-failed nineteenth-century social experiments, suggests America was always this way. He’s not entirely optimistic about it, though. Writing during Prohibition, he laments the turn away from what he explicitly calls “libertarian” experiments in the nineteenth century toward the legally-enforced experiments imposed on the whole nation in his own century.
I’m reminded by the book of the long second chapter of Brian Doherty’s Radicals for Capitalism, with its array of nineteenth-century political oddballs who may or may not be the direct precursors of today’s libertarians but certainly added to America’s extremist tendencies. You could almost subtitle Seldes’ book “The Days When Christian Absolutists, Anti-Alcohol Crusaders, Free-Love Practitioners, and Even Communists Were All Libertarians.”
As Seldes describes things, both the impulse to turn toward God and the impulse to turn toward Washington, DC can be traced back to eighteenth-century fire-and-brimstone preacher Jonathan Edwards, who famously likened us all to loathsome “sinners in the hands of an angry God.” What Edwards did not foresee was that my can-do Connecticut ancestors, bless ’em, would not take their loathsome unworthiness lying down but would instead respond to Edwards’ admonishments by launching into numerous programs of self-improvement and earthly paradise-making, egged on by Edwards-level fiery public speakers and demagogic leaders (the churchgoers in Enfield also eventually decided not to hear any more Edwards sermons, which is an important overlooked wrinkle).
As Seldes puts it, “The members of the Enfield congregation were not aware of it but, as they dispersed to their homes, they carried with them the promise of libertarian religion in New England, of religions without Hell and cults without God.”
By century’s end, there would be a few surviving, enduring will-emphasizing faiths such as Christian Science and elements of what we now call New Age, as well as a bigger self-help/spiritual aspiration vibe in the culture as a whole, but many frustrated reformers would turn to government to impose the visions they couldn’t make work on voluntary communal farms in rural Indiana or upstate New York.
Obviously, I favor the libertarian approach over state-imposed solutions, and the nineteenth century radicals are a vivid reminder that this distinction doesn’t map easily onto the current right/left spectrum model (though, as I suggested earlier, many radicals may be on a different sort of spectrum). The temptation to shoehorn all political and cultural disagreements into the right/left model is so great that I wouldn’t be surprised to find that many intellectuals secretly find themselves trying to decide whether, say, Cromwell, Julius Caesar, or St. Augustine count as conservatives or leftists. But we don’t need to look back that far to find cases that don’t easily fit the current (faltering) system of classification.
Many of America’s most popular nineteenth-century radicals, for instance, were individuals who simultaneously embraced fundamentalist Christianity, free love, voluntary communism, a belief that government should stay out of the economy, veganism, abolitionism, an avoidance of mainstream political activity, and carefully-defined gender roles. Stick that in your spectrum, if you can, Mr./Mrs. Democrat or Republican!