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	<title>Comments on: Quixotic Opposition, Institutional Conflict, and Elite Disagreement</title>
	<link>http://toddseavey.com/2007/11/20/quixotic-opposition-institutional-conflict-and-elite-disagreement/</link>
	<description>Conservatism for punks.</description>
	<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2009 22:27:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>by: AlphaDog</title>
		<link>http://toddseavey.com/2007/11/20/quixotic-opposition-institutional-conflict-and-elite-disagreement/#comment-6410</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Nov 2007 08:12:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://toddseavey.com/2007/11/20/quixotic-opposition-institutional-conflict-and-elite-disagreement/#comment-6410</guid>
					<description>You failed to explain what about the partial-birth abortion article made you feel "less pro-choice."  It's hard to see why any pro-choice person would find complaint with it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You failed to explain what about the partial-birth abortion article made you feel &#8220;less pro-choice.&#8221;  It&#8217;s hard to see why any pro-choice person would find complaint with it.
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		<title>by: Jacob T. Levy</title>
		<link>http://toddseavey.com/2007/11/20/quixotic-opposition-institutional-conflict-and-elite-disagreement/#comment-6341</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:14:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://toddseavey.com/2007/11/20/quixotic-opposition-institutional-conflict-and-elite-disagreement/#comment-6341</guid>
					<description>"the interestingly econ-like argument that the marketplace is not necessarily a solution (not even a gradual one) for the problem of sexism if men constitute a sort of cartel, instinctually or culturally inclined to pay women less throughout the economy rather than in a few isolable firms."

This is closely related to established economic arguments about discrimination.  

If *consumers* have actual preferences about the employees and employment conditions of the firms with which they do business--  white customers don't want to be served by black waiters, or actively prefer firms that they know have separate bathrooms for white and black employees, or whatever-- then the market doesn't tend to undermine discrimination.  And when a prejudice is sufficiently widespread that members of group A can derive a sense of well-being and superiority from their membership in that group-- which is to say from not being members of group B-- then they have a strong reason to have such preferences.  The so-called "psychic wages of whiteness" in the Jim Crow era south meant that white consumers derived utility from the enforcement of a strong wall of segregation-- utility that offset the added monetary costs they had to incur.  And free-riding was kept to a minimum, because the preference applies in each case (the racist white customer really doesn't want to be served by a black employee), so the individual and collective incentives were mutually-reinforcing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;the interestingly econ-like argument that the marketplace is not necessarily a solution (not even a gradual one) for the problem of sexism if men constitute a sort of cartel, instinctually or culturally inclined to pay women less throughout the economy rather than in a few isolable firms.&#8221;</p>
<p>This is closely related to established economic arguments about discrimination.  </p>
<p>If *consumers* have actual preferences about the employees and employment conditions of the firms with which they do business&#8211;  white customers don&#8217;t want to be served by black waiters, or actively prefer firms that they know have separate bathrooms for white and black employees, or whatever&#8211; then the market doesn&#8217;t tend to undermine discrimination.  And when a prejudice is sufficiently widespread that members of group A can derive a sense of well-being and superiority from their membership in that group&#8211; which is to say from not being members of group B&#8211; then they have a strong reason to have such preferences.  The so-called &#8220;psychic wages of whiteness&#8221; in the Jim Crow era south meant that white consumers derived utility from the enforcement of a strong wall of segregation&#8211; utility that offset the added monetary costs they had to incur.  And free-riding was kept to a minimum, because the preference applies in each case (the racist white customer really doesn&#8217;t want to be served by a black employee), so the individual and collective incentives were mutually-reinforcing.
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